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Abstract. Though most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are agricultural-based, the region is a net importer of 
food and agricultural products and experiences the highest level of food insecurity globally. The government have a joint 
goal of achieving a favourable balance of trade and food security; hence this study examines the causal relationship 
between quality of governance and net-import dependency on food and agricultural products for 25 SSA countries 
during the period 1995-2015. Principal component analysis is employed to develop a governance index based on the six 
worldwide governance indicators and a multivariate panel vector error correction framework applied to infer causality in 
the short and long run. The results reveal that a higher governance index is correlated with a lower net-import 
dependency ratio and the relationship is statistically significant. Evidence of unidirectional causality running from 
governance to net-import dependency is reported in 14 SSA countries, mainly in the long run. In conclusion, improving 
governance quality could support reduced food and agricultural net-import dependency through promoting agriculture 
production, exports and consequently reduced trade deficits in the long run. Hence, governance reforms in the region 
should be placed at the heart of the agricultural development agenda. 
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Global food demand is expected to increase with the increasing world population which is 
projected to be over 9.1 billion by 2050 with much of the population increase expected to be 
seen in SSA (Parker, 2011; OECD and FAO, 2016; EIU, 2018). Governments and international 
organizations are working aggressively by employing policies and innovating ways tailored 
towards eliminating hunger and malnutrition for all in the context of the Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) agenda 2030. Most countries rely on food and agricultural imports to 
cover their demand deficits and feed their growing population. The number of countries 
depending on food imports and the rate of import dependency have been growing gradually as 
population and national income increases. However, most developing countries listed as Net 
Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs) by World Trade Organization (WTO) suffer from 
food trade deficit (WTO, 2016) and more often than not find difficulty in covering their food 
import bills. Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and NFIDCs receive WTO Agriculture 
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Agreement special treatment1, which may be further driving them to fall into the net-importer 
trap. The 2007-2008 global financial crisis revealed that international trade on food is not always 
efficient in delivering food security (Christiaensen, 2009; Gilbert, 2011; Murphy, 2015). This 
view led most economies to re-examine their food supply agenda with much consideration on 
food self-sufficiency2 and sustainability. Food self-sufficiency is now open to debate where 
some authors hold the view that international agricultural trade promotes food security by 
stabilizing food supply and food prices (Clapp, 2015; FAO and Ishrat, 2016; Clapp, 2016; 
EIU,2018), while others advocate domestic production to meet local food demand 
(Christiaensen, 2009; Murphy, 2015). More importantly, advocates of international agricultural 
trade are cognizant of the fact that imports dependency makes a country vulnerable to external 
shocks such as food price spikes, volatility, food riots and export bans imposed by exporting 
countries (Clapp, 2016; Martin, 2017; EIU, 2018). Moreover, trade deficits have undesirable 
implication to the overall economic performance of a country. 
Despite SSA being well endowed with fresh water, labour and arable land for agriculture 
production, the region is a net importer of food and agricultural products, having the highest 
percentage cereal import dependency of 18.59 percent on average over the years from 2001 to 
2013. Moreover, it is the most food-insecure region globally and has the highest prevalence of 
undernourishment which has been increasing from 2014-2017. The percentage of the 
population suffering from chronic food deprivation was 23.2 in 2017 (FAO et al., 2018). 
Apparently, the underlying problem in SSA and Africa, in general, is beyond a resource 
endowment one. Besides, the underdevelopment problem and food insecurity in the region is 
partly due to failures in local policy, institutions, local governance and international governance 
regimes (World Bank, 1989; Chhotray and Stoker, 2008; IFPRI, 2018). Moreover, the frequent 
food and agriculture scandals in African economies pertaining to food supply, food safety and 
health standards, and embezzlement of funds meant for agriculture and rural development is 
clear evidence of deficiency in governance. Governance failure portrayed by political and 
economic instability, limited voice and accountability, low government effectiveness, poor 
regulatory quality, corruption, and the poor rule of law, is among the major challenges facing the 
implementation of agriculture policies for development agenda (World Bank, 2008). According 
to IFPRI (2018), a few African countries have improved their food and nutrition status 
significantly as a result of their governments’ commitment and reforms for agriculture 
development and food security. The big question, therefore, is how governance in SSA 
positions itself in reference to a country’s food and agriculture net-import dependency amidst 
high levels of food and nutrition insecurity. 
Basically, there is limited literature on the relationship between governance and agricultural 
trade despite the critical role of government in regulating trade and ensuring food and nutrition 
security. As a matter of fact, much of the existing literature is qualitative and is characterized by 
policy responses to major global food crises such as the world food crisis of the early 1970s, the 
                                                     
1 LDCs and NFIDCs are eligible to request financial assistant under aid programme to facilitate their food imports see 
WTO (2016). 
2 For a broader discussion on food self sufficiency, see Clapp J. (2016). 
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2007-08 food crisis and 2010-11 price shocks (Margulis, 2017). This study examines the causal 
effect of the quality of governance on food and agricultural products import dependency in SSA. 
The study is quantitative and focuses on the disaggregated dimensions of governance. 
Moreover, we develop a composite governance index based on the six worldwide governance 
indicators using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). We compare the effect of each 
governance indicator and the overall governance index on net-import dependency. 
Consequently, the causality between the composite governance index and import dependency 
on food and agricultural products is examined. 
The study contributes to the existing agricultural international trade literature by showing that 
governance plays a significant role in the food and agricultural import dependency status of a 
country. The results reveal that a higher governance index is correlated with lower net-import 
dependency. As such, strengthening corruption control measures, government effectiveness, 
voice and accountability, and the rule of law significantly reduces net-import dependency on 
food and agricultural products. Hence, increasing governance quality in SSA could support 
reduced net-import dependency in the long run. These results provide a basis for formulating 
policies designed to promote international agricultural trade for economic development and food 
security. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; section two provides a review of literature on 
agricultural international trade and governance. Empirical application and procedure of analysis 
are explained in section three, while section four presents the results and further discussions on 
the findings. Finally, section five provides the conclusion and recommendations of the study. 
 
2.  Literature review 
Governance and agricultural trade 
Governance and agricultural trade interact in different pathways that promote the four pillars of 
food security, namely, food accessibility, availability, utilization and stability. Agriculture 
production facilitates food supply and availability while agricultural trade ensures the distribution 
of food and global food stability. Government has a role in solving market failure and promoting 
competition which in turn lowers commodity prices making food affordable and accessible to 
consumers. In addition, through the labor market, households earn income which increases 
their purchasing power which enables them to diversify their dietary intake and improve their 
nutritional status. Furthermore, trade policies affect government services which in turn impact 
either positively or negatively on the various food security dimensions and the general 
performance of the national economy (FAO and Ishrat, 2016). Furthermore, stable governance 
reduces the uncertainty that hinders investment and pollutes the business environment, thereby 
promoting international trade. 
According to Martin (2017), trade liberalization reduces poverty rates and improves 
nutritional outcomes. However, export subsidies in developed countries lead to dumping in 
developing countries. Dumping gradually destroy local agricultural industries which cannot 
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compete in the international market, causing more harm to the importing countries. Logically, if 
the money used to cover imports bills were spent within the domestic economy, it would have a 
multiplier effect, thereby boosting agriculture and economic growth. Sadler and Magnan (2011) 
provide an overview of strategies which if adopted by importing governments, could lead to a 
reduction of risks associated with imports dependency. 
The government ought to and can create an enabling environment for the smooth functioning 
of the different pathways and agencies actively involved in food policy to support agriculture for 
development (Gupte and Longhurst, 2018). In addition, some studies (Fanzo et al., 2014; 
Nisbett and Barnett, 2017; Kohli et al., 2017) found that a high level of political leadership is an 
important driver and creates an enabling environment for improved food security and nutrition in 
a country. However, most national governments in developing countries face difficulty in 
providing public goods such as the rule of law, civil peace, infrastructure and public research 
necessary for promoting agricultural productivity (Paarlberg, 2002). While on the one hand, 
governance affects international trade, on the other, a feedback effect exists whereby a 
country’s governance is shaped by international trade (Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008). 
Governance at the national level should be redesigned to effectively provide public goods and 
services in order to promote agricultural productivity, international agricultural trade and 
accelerate the realization of Sustainable Development Goal number 2 (SDG2). 
 
Trends on food and agricultural import dependency  
About 16 percent of the world population depends on international trade to meet their food and 
agricultural products demand. It is expected that most low-income countries will continue to 
depend on external land and water resources (Fader et al., 2013). Trade, whether domestic or 
international, increases household income and government revenue. By this, it increases diet 
diversity and promotes the stability of food supply (Burnett and Murphy, 2014; Brooks and 
Matthews, 2015). 
In 1993, Latin America and the Caribbean were the leading grain importer in the world with 
an import dependency of 36.5 percent followed by SSA with 13.6 percent (Paarlberg, 2002). 
Africa, Asia and the Caribbean have been net importers of food and agricultural products on 
average and have been experiencing trade deficit for all periods between 1990 and 2016. 
Moreover, they are net importers of cereals and pulses, which are the major foods that they 
depend on for their daily meals. The trade deficits have been increasing over the years, and the 
figures more than doubled for the period 2010-2016. The increase in trade deficits could partly 
be explained by the rising import dependency coupled with the rising international food prices. 
For all these periods, most developed countries had a food and agricultural trade surplus. 
Interestingly, Europe has a trade deficit on food and agricultural products for all the periods but, 
the deficits decreased significantly for the period 2010-2016, contrary to what was happening in 
many developing countries. These world trade balances on agricultural products, food and 
selected crops are illustrated in Appendix A, Table A.1. 
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According to Valdés and Foster (2012), the number of developing countries who are both 
net-agricultural importers and net-food importers increased from 74 in 1999 to 89 in 2009, with 
an increase from 25 to 31 out of 51 SSA countries. Most developing countries are net-importers 
of staple food grains, and their dependency on imports has been increasing over the recent 
years (Murphy, 2015; EIU, 2017). 
All African countries depend on food and agricultural products imports though the degree of 
dependency varies across countries. FAO (2012), using data for the period 1960-2007, reported 
that Africa, despite its agricultural potential, has been a net importer of food and of agricultural 
products. During 2007-2011, 37 African countries were net importers of food while 22 countries 
were net importers of agricultural raw materials (Blein et al., 2013). Due to arable land and 
water constraints, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) mostly depend on imported food 
and is the largest grain importer in the world (Sadler and Magnan, 2011). 
 
Conceptual framework 
For the purpose of discussions in this paper, the study adopts the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) (1997) definition of governance as; “the exercise of political and 
administrative authority at all levels to manage a country’s affairs. It comprises the mechanisms, 
processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences”3. This definition 
consolidates three World Bank definitions of governance. That is, “the exercise of political 
power to manage a nation’s affairs” (World Bank, 1989), “the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources” (World Bank, 
1994), and “the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the 
authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services” (World Bank, 2007). 
World Bank uses six indicators, namely, control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
political stability and absence of violence, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, and the 
rule of law to assess the quality of governance (Kaufmann et al., 2004). Good governance is 
built on three basic principles, namely, Participation and Inclusion, Accountability and Rule of 
Law, and Non-Discrimination and Equality (UNDP, 2011). Based on these principles, good 
governance is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective 
and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and respects the rule of law. It takes into account the 
interests and the most vulnerable in society in decision-making and minimizes corruption. In 
addition to these components of good governance, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) states that good governance is also forward-looking in the sense that it is 
able to make predictions about future trends and develop policies to deal with anticipated future 
changes. Any compromise on the stated principles and components of good governance results 
in poor governance and its consequences. Good governance is claimed to promote 
international trade for sustainable economic development (UN, 1998; Kaufmann and Kraay, 
                                                     
3 See more discussion on governance in UNDP Strategy Note on Governance for Human Development, 2000. 
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2002; Resnick and Birner, 2006). According to Knack and Keefer (1995), the quality of 
governance significantly affects the investment rate in an economy. Moreover, donor agencies 
tag their aid disbursement on the quality of a country’s governance (Gisselquist, 2012). 
 
3. Data and methodology 
Data 
The study used Panel data for 25 SSA countries for the period 1995-2015. The countries were 
selected based on data availability. Since countries are heterogeneous in reference to their 
levels of development, environmental aspects, and consequently imports demand, they were 
classified into middle income, low-income countries, oil producers, and non-oil producers based 
on World Bank classification. The countries included in the sample are shown in Table A.2. 
Data were mainly collected from World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), The 
Food and Agriculture Organization Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Net Imports Dependency Ratio (NIDR) was computed based on FAO 
definition of Import Dependency Ratio (IDR)4. NIDR on food and agricultural products was 
computed using data on total agriculture, which includes cultivation of crops for food and feed, 
cash crops, livestock production, plus forestry, hunting, and fishing as described by FAO. It was 
calculated as follows: 
 
NIDR= (Imports-Exports)*100/(Production+Imports-Exports)                             (1) 
 
The quality of governance was measured using the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 
scores on the six governance dimensions, namely voice and accountability, corruption control, 
government effectiveness, political stability and absence of violence, regulatory quality, and the 
rule of law (Kaufmann et al., 2004; 2010). We developed a composite governance index that 
comprehensively captures the six dimensions of governance using PCA. Table 1 presents the 
description of the variables and the corresponding data sources. 
The dependent variable is NIDR, while the predictor variables of interest in this study are the 
six governance dimensions and the composite governance index. Control variables added in 
our analysis include agriculture productivity indicators such as agriculture value added per 
worker and total factor productivity (TFP). Other control variables are the exchange rate, 
inflation, foreign reserves, population, economic growth and natural resource endowment 





                                                     
4IDR is computed as; imports * 100/ (production + imports - exports).  
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Table 1. Variable description and data sources. 
Variable Code Definition  Data source 
Net-import dependency ratio NIDR Ratio of net imports to domestic 
food utilization 
Computed 
Governance Index Govindex Composite governance indicator Computed 
Control of corruption Corrpcont Governance indicator 1 World bank 
Government effectiveness Goveff Governance indicator 2 World bank 








Regulatory quality  Regqlty Governance indicator 4 World bank 
Rule of law Ruoflaw Governance indicator 5 World bank 
Voice and accountability Voiceacc Governance indicator 6 World bank 
Agriculture value added per 
worker 
Agrivapw Productivity indicator 1 FAOSTAT 
Total factor productivity TFP Productivity indicator 2 FAO 
Exchange rate Exrate Real exchange rate IMF 
Inflation CPI Consumer Price Index IMF 
Foreign currency reserves  Foretodebt Foreign reserves to debt ratio World bank 
Population  lnpopu Log (population) World bank 
Economic growth GDPpc Real GDP per capita World bank 
Fresh water endowment lnfreshh20 Log(fresh water) FAOSTAT 




To examine the impact of the quality of governance on food and agricultural import dependency, 
panel data framework was used due to the flexibility it allows in modelling differences in 
behaviour across entities and its ability to solve sample selection bias (Greene, 2012). Panel 
regression models, namely, Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which assumes 
homogeneity, Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effects (RE), were estimated in order to select the 
appropriate model for the data. The general modelling framework is expressed as: 
 
itiititiitit cxzxy εβεαβ ++=++= '''                                                                              (2) 
 
where ic capture the heterogeneity or individual effect and itε  is the idiosyncratic errors. For the 
case of pooled regression, iz contains only a constant term. However, if iz  is unobserved but 
correlated with itx  then fixed effect would be the appropriate model. Finally, if ic  is 
uncorrelated with itx , then random effect would be evident. 
First, the pooled OLS and RE were estimated using STATA software. Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) was done to make a 
decision between a random effects regression and a Pooled OLS regression. The null 
hypothesis of variances across entities is zero, H0: σ²µ=0; was tested against the alternative 
hypothesis that variances across entities is not equal to zero; H1:σ²µ≠0. The LM test statistic is 
calculated by: 







































nTLM                                                                                    (3) 
 
The estimated pooled OLS and RE equations are given in model 4 and 5, respectively. 
 
itititit XGNIDR εβλα +++= ''                                                                                         (4) 
 
where NIDR is the net import dependency ratio, G is a vector of governance indicators and X is 
a vector of control variables. In the case of pooled OLS, λ and β include constant terms. 
 
itiititit XGNIDR εµβλα ++++= '' ,                                                                               (5) 
 
where, µi is a group specific random element. 
Consequently, RE model and FE model were estimated and Hausman specification test 
devised by Hausman (1978) was done in order to make a choice between RE model and FE 
model. Under the null hypothesis, the preferred model is RE, while for the alternative 




−= REFEbH β ′ )(][
1
∧
− −− REFEREFE bVV β                                                                         (6) 
 
where b and 
^
β  are the coefficient vectors, V is the covariance matrix, FE is the consistent 
estimator and RE is the efficient estimator. 
The FE models which account for entity fixed effect only and for both entity and time fixed 
effects are as follows: 
 
itiititit XGNIDR εγβλ +++= ''                                                                                        (7) 
ittiititit XGNIDR εσγβλ ++++= ''                                                                                (8) 
 
where γi is the country fixed effect and σt is the year fixed effect. 
 
Cross-section dependence and Panel unit root test  
Pesaran (2006) show substantial bias and size distortions in estimates when cross-section 
dependence in panel data is overlooked. Hence we test the data for cross-section dependence 
using LM test devised by Breusch and Pagan (1980). The test has a null hypothesis of no 
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cross-section dependence 0)cov(:0 =jtitH εε  for all t and ji ≠  and an alternative 
hypothesis of cross-section dependence 0)cov(:0 ≠jtitH εε . To compute the LM statistic, 













ijCD TLM ρ 0 2/)1(
2 −NNχ                                                                                 (9) 
where ijρ̂  is the estimate of the pair-wise correlation of the residuals from the estimation of the 
model (7). 
Given that causality tests require the variables to be stationary, we tested our data for non-
stationary using panel unit root tests proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999), and Pesaran (2007). 
The Fisher-type test by Maddala and Wu (1999) denoted as MW hereafter is a first-generation 
panel unit root test and assumes cross-section independence across panels. The assumption of 
cross-section independence is very restrictive; hence we also apply the Cross-sectional 
augmented Im, Pesaran, and Shin (CIPS) test proposed by Pesaran (2007). The CIPS test is a 
second-generation panel unit root test that allows for cross-sectional dependency. Both tests 
can be applied in unbalanced panels and series having different lags. The tests are based on 








,,1.,                                                                            (10) 
where ∆ is the first difference operator, iρ  and iβ  are the autoregressive coefficients, T is 
the time span of the panel, and N is the number of cross-sections. The null hypothesis, 
0:0 =iH ρ  for all I, all panels contain unit root is tested against the alternative hypothesis; 
0:1 <iH ρ  for at least one i, some panels are stationary. Both tests allow for heterogeneity, 
since iρ is allowed to vary across the cross-sections. 
 
Panel cointegration test 
Having established the order of integration and non-stationary of our variables from the unit root 
tests, the next step is to test whether governance is cointegrated with net-import dependency on 
food and agricultural products. Cointegration implies long-run equilibrium relationship between 
the two variables. The two widely used panel cointegration tests in economic literature proposed 
by Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Westerlund (2005) are used. Pedroni (1999, 2004) test is residual-
based and allows for heterogeneity in the slopes and intercepts of the cointegrating equation. 
Fixed effects and individual specific deterministic trends in the panels are allowed. Westerlund 
(2005) is based on error correction model hence have a higher power of test compared to the 
test proposed by Pedroni (1999, 2004). It allows for heterogeneity and accounts for cross-
section correlation. The null hypothesis in both tests is that of no cointegration among variables 
in individual panels. The alternative hypothesis in Pedroni (1999, 2004) test is that all panels are 
cointegrated while in Westerlund (2005) test, the alternative hypothesis is that some panels are 





Granger causality test 
By definition, if the past values of a stationary variable x  can aid in the prediction of another 
stationary variable ty conditional on having accounted for the effects of past values of y  on ty  
then, x  is said to “Granger cause” ty  (Granger, 1969). We established that governance and 
net-import dependency are integrated of order one, I (1). Hence, a Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) was used to test whether governance index “granger cause” net-import 
dependency. Two steps procedure of estimating VECM followed by Engle and Granger (1987) 
were adopted. The first step involves the estimation of the following model in order to obtain the 
residuals. 
 
titiiiti GovNIDR ,,1, εγα ++= ,                                                                                        (11) 
 
where iα  is the cross-sections fixed effect. The first lags of the residuals are used as a proxy 
for vector error correction term, which represents any deviation from long-run equilibrium 
between governance and import dependency. In the second step, a multivariate panel VECM 










































                   (12) 
where, niθ for n = 1,2 are country-specific fixed effects and knn,θ are the coefficients 
corresponding to the kth lag of the endogenous variables. nλ  are the coefficients of the error 
correction terms and nit ,µ are idiosyncratic errors. 
The VECM is used to test both short-run and long-run causality. To test short-run causality, 
the significance of the coefficients knn,θ  is tested using the standard Wald F-test. The null 
hypothesis 0: ,0 =knnH θ  for k=1,..., K is tested against the alternative hypothesis 
0: ,0 ≠knnH θ   
Since the focus of this study is on whether governance “granger cause” imports dependency, 
rejecting the null hypothesis 0: ,120 =kH θ imply that governance “granger cause” import 
dependency in the short run. For long-run causality, the significance of the coefficient nλ is also 
tested using the standard Wald test. The null hypothesis is 0:0 =λH  where 21,.λλλ =  and 
the alternative hypothesis is 0:0 ≠λH . In this study, rejecting the null hypothesis implies 
governance “granger cause” import dependency in the long run. The coefficients of the ECT, nλ  
represents the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium in case a shock occurs. 
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4. Results and discussion 
Table 2 presents the results of the preliminary analysis in the model specification. The results of 
Breusch-Pagan LM for random effect provide strong evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis 
for no random effect. In other words, strong evidence for significant difference across units and 
within group’s correlation was found. 
 
Table 2. Summary of preliminary tests results. 
Test  Statistic  p-Value 
LM for Randon effects 1509.54 0.000 
Hausman Specification 22.95 0.018 
Time-fixed effect 1.49 0.079 
LMCD 998.267 0.000 
Notes. The data used for these tests covers the full sample period from 1995 to 2015. 
 
The results for Hausman test were in favour of FE. Therefore, FE model was selected as the 
consistent model with the data and was used for the analysis. Furthermore, the results for the 
presence of time-fixed effects test provided evidence for not rejecting the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients for all the years’ dummies are jointly equal to zero. Therefore, in this case, no 
time fixed effects were needed. The test for cross-section dependence gave strong evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sections dependence. In other words, the residuals across 
entities are correlated. 
Table 3 summarises the results of the estimated regression using fixed effect model, where 
the NIDR is the dependent variable is presented. At first, we used the six governance indicators 
as our variables of interest and later added control variables. Column 1 of Table 3 shows the 
result of the short model without the control variables. Here, the coefficients for corruption 
control, government effectiveness and, voice and accountability are negative and statistically 
significant at the 0.01 significance level. The coefficient for the rule of law is also negative and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. However, the coefficients for political 
stability and regulatory quality are positive and are both not significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 
significance levels. 84.8% of the variation in the net-import dependency ratio is explained by the 
six governance indicators. This value of R-squared is considerably high. 
Column 2 of Table 3 shows the estimation results when agricultural productivity indicators, 
namely agricultural value-added per worker and total factor productivity are added to the model. 
The signs of all the governance indicators remain the same as before. The coefficients for 
corruption control, government effectiveness, and voice and accountability are significant at the 
0.01 level. When exchange rate, inflation and foreign reserves to debt ratio are added to the 
base model, the signs of the coefficients for the governance indicators remain the same as 
before. The coefficients for regulatory quality and rule of law are significant at the 0.05 
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Table 3. Regression results for net-import dependency and governance indicators. 
 
 
Furthermore, addition of more control variables into the model, that is; log population, GDP 
per capita, log fresh water and log agricultural land, does not change the sign and the 
significance of the coefficients for all the governance indicators. All the control variables have 
the expected signs. (See column 4 and 5 of Table 3). Finally, fixed effect robust errors are used 
to solve possible heteroscedasticity, and the results are illustrated in column 6 of Table 3. 
These results imply that an increase in corruption control is expected to reduce food and 
agricultural import dependency, holding all other things constant. The same case applies to 
government effectiveness, voice and accountability, and rule of law. However, an increase in 
political stability is expected to increase food and agricultural import dependency. Similarly, an 
increase in regulatory quality is expected to increase food and agricultural import dependency, 
holding all other things constant. 
Corruption undermines agricultural productivity by eroding national and farmers’ income. It 
creates market failures such as monopoly and enhances selfish arrangements that address 
personal interest gains (EIU, 2018). Campos et al. (1999) and Dahlström et al. (2012) showed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES NIDR NIDR NIDR NIDR NIDR NIDR 
Corrpcont -0.416*** -0.436*** -0.438*** -0.361*** -0.357*** -0.357 
 (0.089) (0.093) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099) (0.266) 
Polstab 0.073 0.059 0.071 0.0822 0.086* 0.0861 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.052) (0.052) (0.101) 
Goveff -0.293*** -0.306*** -0.313*** -0.325*** -0.325*** -0.325 
 (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.196) 
Regqlty 0.131 0.149 0.193** 0.221** 0.219** 0.219 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.174) 
Ruoflaw -0.229** -0.212* -0.279** -0.287** -0.289** -0.289 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.212) 
Voiceacc -0.264*** -0.263*** -0.242*** -0.241*** -0.242*** -0.242 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) (0.155) 
Agrivapw  -0.001 -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
TFP  0.017 -0.020 -0.122** -0.121** -0.121 
  (0.043) (0.049) (0.054) (0.058) (0.089) 
Exrate   -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
CPI   0.0377* -0.046 -0.048* -0.048 
   (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.041) 
Foretodebt   0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
lnpopu    20.49*** 20.85*** 20.85* 
    (5.826) (7.183) (12.00) 
GDPpc    0.003** 0.003** 0.003 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
lnfreshh2o     -7.258 -7.258 
     (11.380) (9.234) 
lnagril     -0.302 -0.302 
     (5.192) (7.936) 
Observations 525 525 525 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.848 0.849 0.851 0.856 0.856 0.278 
Number of 
country 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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that reducing corruption encourages productive investment. In addition, corruption diverts public 
funds meant for boosting agriculture development to personal gains. As such, corruption 
reduces public spending on agriculture leading to low agricultural output. Public expenditure on 
agriculture in SSA has been stagnating at relatively low levels in comparison to other regions in 
the world (Vos, 2015; FAO, 2012). Corruption control, therefore, can promote investment in the 
agriculture sector which in turn would increase domestic agricultural production and supply. This 
could reduce dependency on imports and also provide a surplus for export. 
Conflict and political instability hamper economic and trade integration (Blein et al., 2013). In 
addition, conflicts and political unrest negatively affect the production and distribution of food 
and agricultural products, both domestically and internationally. Political stability, therefore, 
creates a good environment for trade, the creation of bilateral agreements and agricultural FDI 
flows. Furthermore, it promotes the distribution from areas of high supply-low demand to areas 
of high demand-low supply. Increases in income further boost consumption demand. According 
to EIU (2018), political stability is essential for agricultural productivity. Since the agriculture 
sector in Africa has been stagnating, much of the increased consumer demand is met by 
imports. Hence, if governments do not support agricultural production to meet local demand and 
promote exports, import dependency will be inevitable. 
Improving government effectiveness promotes the provision of public goods such as 
infrastructure, agricultural research and other public expenditures in agriculture which promote 
agricultural productivity and reduce import dependency. According to Paarlberg (2002), East 
and Southeast Asia experienced reduced hunger and malnutrition through the provision of 
public goods such as internal peace, the rule of law, infrastructure, agricultural research and 
investment by the government. However, in SSA where the governments have not effectively 
provided these public goods, the citizens continue to suffer from hunger and rural poverty. To 
reduce import dependency in SSA, the agriculture sector needs to be revived. This calls for a 
paradigm shift of governance at the local, institutional and national level. Therefore, governance 
reforms should be placed at the heart of the agricultural development agenda. 
Since regulatory quality captures the perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development, the positive sign of regulatory quality can be explained by the fact that the few 
large companies and importing cartels are able to corrupt their operations in order to maximize 
their gains from imports at the expense of the public interest. Therefore, improving regulatory 
quality without reducing corruption, promotes private sector development and increases import 
dependency. Moreover, corruption threatens the respect for the rule of law and voice and 
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Table 4. Regression results for net-import dependency and the composite governance index. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES NIDR NIDR NIDR NIDR NIDR 
Lgovindex  -2.606*** -2.592*** -1.903*** -1.903 
  (0.575) (0.618) (0.622) (1.337) 
Agrivapw   -0.0003 -0.003* -0.003 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
TFP   0.003 -0.154** -0.154 
   (0.055) (0.061) (0.109) 
Exrate   0.0004 0.001 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CPI   0.0105 -0.101*** -0.101* 
   (0.022) (0.030) (0.058) 
Foretodebt   0.004 0.004 0.004 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
lnpopu    26.24*** 26.24* 
    (6.324) (15.29) 
GDPpc    0.005*** 0.005** 
    (0.001) (0.002) 
Govindex -2.893***     
 (0.561)     
Observations 525 500 500 500 500 
R-squared 0.811 0.816 0.817 0.828 0.102 
Number of country 25 25 25 25 25 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
To allow a comparison of the effect of the different governance indicators and the composite 
governance index on net-import dependency, we examined the relationship between the 
composite governance index and import dependency on food and agricultural products. Lag one 
of governance index is used to control potential endogeneity. The results in Table 4 shows that 
the coefficients for governance index and lag governance index are negative and significant at 
the 0.01 significance level. In line with the results presented in Table 3, 81.1% of the variation in 
net-import dependency is explained by governance index. 
Adding control variables does not change the sign and significance of the coefficient of lag 
governance index, but the magnitude decreases, as shown in column 3 and 4 of Table 4. 
Robust standard errors are used, and the results are shown in column 5 of Table 4. These 




In order to gain more insight, in this section, we provide robustness checks on the 
aforementioned estimation results. The sample was divided into sub-samples with more 
homogeneous characteristics. At first, the sample was divided into middle income and low-
income countries then into non-oil producing and oil-producing countries. Thereafter, the 
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analysis was repeated using FE model. Since adding more control variables into our base 
model does not change the sign of our variables of interest, we focus on the results presented 
in column 1 of Table 3. 
Table 5 and 6 present the results for the robustness checks. Table 5 shows that in all the 
sub-samples, the results are robust for most of the six governance indicators coefficients. All the 
coefficients of governance indicators have similar signs but different magnitude as observed in 
the main estimation results (Column 1 of Table 3) except for the case of government 
effectiveness in the oil producer sub-sample and the case of the rule of law in the middle-
income sub-sample. Otherwise, the coefficient of government effectiveness is negative in 
middle income, low income and non-oil producer sub-samples and is significant at the 0.01 
significance level. The coefficient for the rule of law is negative in low income, non-oil and oil 
producer subsamples but is only significant at the 0.01 significance level in low-income sub-
sample. 
 
Table 5. Regression results for governance indicators and net-import dependency in different 
country groups. 
 (Middle Income) (Low income) (Non-oil Producer) (Oil Producer) 
VARIABLES NIDR NIDR NIDR NIDR 
Corrpcont -0.765*** -0.061 -0.307** -0.223*** 
 (0.155) (0.116) (0.137) (0.085) 
Polstab 0.036 0.136** 0.131* 0.0891** 
 (0.086) (0.064) (0.076) (0.045) 
Goveff -0.126 -0.392*** -0.679*** 0.189*** 
 (0.160) (0.103) (0.125) (0.068) 
Regqlty 0.434*** 0.372*** 0.319** 0.069 
 (0.141) (0.121) (0.148) (0.076) 
Ruoflaw 0.333* -0.657*** -0.185 -0.038 
 (0.191) (0.144) (0.173) (0.102) 
Voiceacc -0.228 -0.431*** -0.657*** -0.221*** 
 (0.142) (0.111) (0.149) (0.066) 
Agrivapw -0.003*** -0.014** -0.004 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) 
TFP -0.303*** -0.064 -0.147* -0.179*** 
 (0.080) (0.069) (0.079) (0.046) 
lnpopu 22.91*** 43.19*** 12.75* 29.26*** 
 (8.014) (7.837) (6.827) (3.861) 
GDPpc 0.003*** -0.029*** -0.002 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) 
Observations 189 336 315 210 
R-squared 0.943 0.764 0.849 0.950 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
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The coefficient of corruption control is negative in all sub-samples and significant at the 0.01 
level in middle income and oil producer sub-samples, while it is significant at the 0.05 level in 
the non-oil producer sub-sample. Coefficients for political stability and regulatory quality are 
positive in all sub-samples. Political stability coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level in low-
income countries and oil producers sub-samples, while regulatory quality is significant at the 
0.01 level in middle income and low-income sub-samples and is significant at the 0.05 level in 
the non-oil producer sub-sample. The coefficient of voice and accountability is negative in all the 
sub-samples and is significant at the 0.01 significance level in low income, non-oil producer and 
oil producer sub-samples. 
 
Table 6. Regression result for the composite governance index and net-import dependency in 
different country groups. 
 (Middle Income ) ( Low income) (Non-oil Producer) (Oil Producer) 
VARIABLES NIDR NIDR NIDR NIDR 
Lgovindex -0.569 -3.733*** -4.646*** -1.401*** 
 (0.801) (0.846) (0.950) (0.451) 
Agrivapw -0.002 -0.008 0.0002 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) 
TFP -0.196** 0.0536 -0.006 -0.046 
 (0.085) (0.081) (0.091) (0.046) 
lnpopu 1.023 -11.35* -8.604*** 8.511*** 
 (2.700) (6.650) (3.010) (1.550) 
GDPpc 0.005*** 0.021 0.001 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.014) (0.002) (0.001) 
Observations 180 320 300 200 
R-squared 0.928 0.656 0.794 0.942 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
The analysis of the relationship between the composite governance index and import 
dependency in the sub-samples reveals that the lag of the governance index is negative in all 
the sub-samples and significant at the 0.01 level in low income, non-oil producing and oil-
producing countries. The results presented in Table 6 are robust in consideration to the results 
presented in Table 4. 
Panel Granger causality 
After we have established the relationship between the quality of governance and net-imports 
dependency on food and agricultural products, the next step is to determine the existence or 
non-existence of causality between the two variables. In this section, we present the results of 
the panel unit root, cointegration and causality tests. The variables of interest are the NIDR and 
the composite governance index. MW and CIPS unit root tests were applied to test non-
stationary in our data. The results of both panel unit root tests are presented in Table 7. 




Table 7. Panel unit root tests results. 
(a) CIPS test 
  Without trend With trend 
Variable lags Z-bar statistic p-value Z-bar statistic p-value 
NIDR 0 -4.514 0.000 -3.838 0.000 
 1 -3.036 0.001 -2.073 0.019 
 2 -1.018 0.154 0.274 0.610 
      
Govindex 0 -0.642 0.261 1.254 0.895 
 1 -2.057 0.020 -0.533 0.297 
 2 -0.751 0.226 2.245 0.988 
(b) MW test 
  2χ  p-value 2χ  p-value 
NIDR 0 108.629 0.000 112.946 0.000 
 1 77.940 0.007 82.671 0.002 
 2 46.662 0.608 44.634 0.688 
      
Govindex 0 47.15 0.588 49.295 0.502 
 1 60.814 0.141 80.659 0.004 
 2 43.459 0.732 44.442 0.695 
Note: The data used for these tests covers the full sample period from 1995 to 2015. 
 
The test for cross-sectional dependence gave strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis of 
no cross-section dependence (see Table 2). However, the results of CIPS test that allows for 
cross-section dependency are considered. Lag 2 was selected when carrying out the test 
though lag one is believed to be optimal. The results show that NIDR is stationary at level and 
at the first difference, both with trend and without trend. The governance index is not stationary 
at level but becomes stationary after the first difference without trend. Hence NIDR and 
governance index are integrated of order I (1). 
The results for the two-panel cointegration tests reveal strong evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis for no cointegration. Table 8 presents the results for Pedroni (1999, 2004) residual 
based test and the Westerlund (2005) error corrected panel cointegration test. The test statistics 
for Pedroni test are negative and significant except for the v. The p-values for the test statistics 
in Westerlund test are less than 0.05. Therefore, in both tests the null hypothesis for no 
cointegration is rejected. These results imply that net-import dependency and governance have 
a long-run relationship. 
 
 
Table 8. Panel cointegration tests results. 
Pedroni cointegration test Westerlund cointegration test  
statistic panel group statistic value Z-value P-value 
ѵ 0.836  Gt -2.194 -2.255 0.012 
ρ -3.92*** -2.002** Ga -10.982 -3.488 0.000 
t-pp -4.726*** -4.699*** Pt -12.798 -5.355 0.000 
t-adf -1.674* -2.561*** Pa -10.044 -6.198 0.000 
Notes: The data used for these tests covers the full sample period from 1995 to 2015. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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To determine parameter estimates of the long-run cointegrating relationship between 
governance and net-import dependency, panel Dynamic Ordinary Least squares (DOLS) were 
estimated using panel group means. DOLS involves including lags and leads in order to 
eliminate potential feedback effects and to control for potential endogeneity and serial 
correlation in the residuals. Lag one and two were included in the model (11). The estimated 
coefficient of governance index is -0.699 and significant with a t-statistic of -2.729. This implies 
that a higher governance index is correlated with lower import dependency. For robustness 
check, and in order to deal with endogeneity problem and ensure consistent estimators are 
obtained, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), which uses lagged differences of the dependent variable as instruments were 
estimated. The first lags of the residuals were used as a proxy for vector ECT in the estimation 
of the VECM specified in model (12). The model was estimated by country in order to better 
infer the existence and directions of the causality. Table 9 presents the summary of the 
coefficients of the lag of the independent variable and the ECT. Significance of the coefficient of 
the ECT implies rejection of the null hypothesis in determining causality in the long run while the 
significance of the coefficient of the independent variable determines causality in the short run. 
The table shows evidence of causality running from governance to net-import dependency in 
Angola, Botswana and Congo in the short run. Evidence of unidirectional causality from 
governance to net-import dependency, in the long run, is seen in Angola, Cameroon, Guinea, 
Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal and Togo. In 
Angola and Botswana, there is evidence of unidirectional causality from governance to net-
import dependency both in the short run and in the long run. 
A unidirectional causality running from net-import dependency to governance is evident in 
the case of Guinea and Kenya. In addition, net-import dependency Granger cause governance 
in the long run in Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
Niger. In Kenya, there is evidence of causality both in the short run and in the long run. There is 
a presence of bidirectional causality in the long run between governance and net-import 
dependency in Zimbabwe and Niger. Out of the 25 SSA countries analyzed, we find 
unidirectional causality from governance to net-import dependency in 14 countries. Wherein, 13 
out of the 14 countries, the causality is in the long run. Unidirectional causality from net-import 
dependency to governance is evident in 10 countries in which 9 out of the 10 countries, the 
causality is in the long run. In conclusion, causality between governance and net-import 
dependency in these countries is mainly in the long run. 
Good governance creates an agricultural investment climate while poor governance 
strengthens the grabbing hand leading to misappropriation of funds meant for agriculture 
investment. This hinders agricultural development and leads to low productivity, which in turn 
creates a supply deficit as the population and demand for more food increases. The resulting 
effect is increased imports to meet the local demand upon which the imports grow more, 
particularly in the case of dumping. If domestic agriculture production is not boosted in order to 
meet the demand and provide for exports, import dependency is inevitable. 




Table 9. Causality between governance and net-import dependency results. 
 
H0:Governance does not Granger-
cause net-import dependency 
H0: net-import dependency does not 
Granger-cause Governance 
Country Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
 LGovindex LECT LNIDR LECT Angola -10.975*** -1.834*** -0.009 -0.464 
Botswana 3.385* -0.767*** -0.026 -0.350 
Chad 0.549 -0.099 0.020 -0.287 
Cameroon 0.362 -0.436*** -0.024 -0.202 
Congo 3.370* -0.074 0.042 -1.014*** 
Ethiopia -5.951 -0.380 -0.004 -0.057 
Guinea 0.602 -0.558** -0.159* -0.002 
Ghana 0.782 -0.002 0.014 -1.04*** 
Kenya 1.862 -0.137 0.039* -0.328* 
Malawi -0.478 -0.373 0.047 -1.058** 
Nigeria 0.518 0.000 0.036 -0.634* 
Rwanda 1.218 -1.122** 0.375 0.011 
Sierra Leone -0.498 -0.302 0.047 -0.101 
South Africa 1.319 -0.532 0.016 -0.038 
Uganda -0.831 -0.268 0.007 -0.405*** 
Zambia -4.027 -0.003 0.003 -0.586* 
Zimbabwe 21.534 -0.265* -0.006 -0.004* 
Central Africa Re -0.353 -0.314 0.144 -0.244 
Benin 2.481 -0.727* 0.017 -0.13 
Burkina Faso 2.307 -0.550* -0.019 -0.007 
Mali -3.333 -0.593** -0.014 -0.057 
Mozambique 1.253 -2.021*** 0.657 -0.131 
Niger -0.458 -0.307* -0.096 -0.763*** 
Senegal -3.065 -0.644* 0.170 -0.156 
Togo -5.311 -0.946* -0.008 -0.062 
Note: The data used covers the full sample period from 1995 to 2015. 




This research investigated the causal relationships between the quality of governance and net-
import dependency on food and agricultural products for 25 SSA countries during the period 
1995-2015. The study was motivated by several factors; firstly, despite most SSA countries 
being agricultural-based and depend on agriculture for their livelihood and economic 
development, the region has the highest level of food insecurity and undernourishment globally. 
Secondly, the persistent increase in food and agricultural net-imports and consequently 
increasing food and agricultural trade deficits in the region and thirdly, governance and 
institution failures have been cited as some of the challenges facing implementation of 
agricultural development agenda and economic development in the region (World Bank, 2008).  
We developed a governance index based on the six worldwide governance indicators using 
the principal component analysis. Subsequently, a fixed effect model was applied to analyze the 
relationships. Panel DOLS and GMM were applied to deal with the endogeneity problem. The 
empirical results reveal that corruption control, government effectiveness, the rule of law and, 
voice and accountability are negatively related to food and agricultural net-import dependency 
and are statistically significant. Therefore, Governments should employ measures to improve 
these governance dimensions in order to promote agricultural productivity. In addition, political 
stability and regulatory quality are positively related to food and agricultural import dependency 
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in SSA. This could be explained by the fact that political stability creates a conducive 
environment for investment and trade. Moreover, it encourages regional integration and bilateral 
agreements, thereby promoting international trade in food and agricultural products. Given the 
high levels of corruption in SSA, government regulations favour private sector development at 
the expense of public interest. This scenario could explain the positive and significant 
relationship between regulatory quality and net-import dependency. Overall, a higher 
governance index is correlated with a lower net-import dependency ratio. 
On causality between governance and net-import dependency on food and agricultural 
products, a multivariate panel vector error correction framework was applied to investigate the 
long-run and short-run causality. Out of the 25 countries studied, evidence of unidirectional 
causality running from governance to net-import dependency in 14 countries is found. In 
addition, unidirectional causality running from net-import dependency to governance is evident 
in 10 countries. We also find evidence of bidirectional causality in 2 countries, i.e. in Zimbabwe 
and Niger. The causality between governance and net-import dependency in these countries is 
mainly in the long run. 
Based on these findings, we conclude that increasing governance quality could support 
reduced net-import dependency on food and agricultural products through promoting 
agricultural production, exports and consequently reduced trade deficit in SSA in the long run. 
Governance reforms considerations in the region are pivotal for sustainable agriculture, food 
security and overall economic development. Therefore, to meet the desired results, measures to 
reduce corruption and strengthen government effectiveness and efficiency should be put in 
place. Moreover, governance needs to be inclusive and democratic so as to factor in the 
interests of all stakeholders in the food and agriculture sector and, more importantly, those of 
producers and the vulnerable population. 
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Table A.1. World food and agricultural products trade balances 1990-2016 (Average value in 
million US$). Source: Authors’ calculation using FAO data,1990-2016.  























Africa 18507.6 13540.2 4967.3 34887.7 21488.8 13399.0 79558.5 45712.4 33846.1 
Asia 112195.2 63712.8 48482.3 188843 111521 77322 451983.8 266848.4 185135.4 
Caribbean 3027.1 2804.1 222 5371 2263.3 3107.7 8953.3 3229.1 5724.2 
Europe 215245 190612.6 24632.4 342629.6 318530.7 24098.9 560424.6 553711.4 6713.3 
North 
America 
43026 66334 -23308 80690.7 97725.2 -17034.5 142997 182606.5 -39609.5 
South 
America 
11357.9 30693.6 -19335.8 18066.4 67618.3 -49552 39639.9 152372.2 -
112732.3 
Oceania 4055.5 19350.9 -15295.4 8506.4 29982.6 -21476.2 17935.1 54367.1 -36432 
Food excl. fish 
Africa 14880.6 7861.3 7019.2 28801.4 13699.8 15101.6 66486.7 31300.0 35186.7 
Asia 74293.5 38120.2 36173.3 132577.5 74614.2 57963.3 326903.7 180188 146715.7 
Caribbean 2494 2262.8 231.2 4240 1240.3 2999.7 7154.1 1824.3 5329.8 
Europe 145688.7 133615.4 12073.3 239453.4 220738.4 18715 397819.3 390644.9 7174.5 
North 
America 
26573.4 46119.5 -19546.1 51540.1 74639.7 -23099.6 93216 144452.4 -51236.4 
South 
America 
8375 18797.3 -10422.2 13548.1 48063.7 -34515.7 29901.4 110558.7 -80657.3 
Oceania 2776.5 13521.6 -10745.1 5882.3 22445.6 -16563.2 12286.3 43589.3 -31303 
Cereals, Total 
Africa 6160.5 496.4 5664.1 11826.9 764.5 11062.4 24396.4 1587.1 22809.2 
Asia 18473.8 5815.2 12658.6 26232.3 11100.3 15132 53278.3 22821.3 30457 
Caribbean 759.4 56.1 703.3 1144.8 31.5 1113.3 1929 55 1874 
Europe 11987.2 12059.9 -72.7 14248.7 17040.9 -2792.2 24170.3 37916.7 -13746.4 
North 
America 
1026.8 15571.6 -14544.8 2017.2 18872.8 -16855.6 3852.7 28865.1 -25012.4 
South 
America 
2918.3 2388.2 530.1 4214.7 4939 -724.3 8287.1 14212.7 -5925.6 
Oceania 240.5 2626.2 -2385.8 438.5 3230.9 -2792.4 788.4 6946.1 -6157.8 
Pulses, Total  
Africa 333.3 70.5 262.9 607 154.1 452.8 1144.2 679.2 465 
Asia 806.9 857.8 -50.9 2076.7 1513.4 563.3 5944.2 2857.1 3087.1 
Caribbean 88.3 1.3 87.0 132.7 4.3 128.3 150.1 6.9 143.2 
Europe 1161.1 624.6 536.4 1033.6 511.2 522.4 1516.5 1042.9 473.7 
North 
America 
85.2 627.8 -542.6 231.1 1367.1 -1136 485.1 3440.3 -2955.1 
South 
America 
215.3 185.2 30.1 277 230.9 46.1 600.4 499.7 100.8 
Oceania 17.7 155.1 -137.4 22.6 287.8 -265.2 39.2 991.6 -952.3 
Coffee, Tea, Cocoa+ Sp, Total 
Africa 830.8 4091.5 -4922.3 1194.8 5976.8 -7171.6 2938.5 11512.3 -14450.8 
Asia 4507.5 5214.8 -707.3 7870.9 8629.7 -758.8 20088.9 21260.8 -1171.9 
Caribbean 52.2 196.3 -144.1 112 175.8 -63.8 205.3 280.4 -75.1 
Europe 17200.1 9669.6 7530.5 26284.7 19085.5 7199.2 52198.2 39656.3 12541.9 
North 
America 
5422.7 1154.1 4268.6 7953.5 2347.3 5606.2 15985.6 4912.7 11072.9 
South 
America 
438.4 4835 -4396.6 720.3 5654.9 -4934.6 1782 12189.5 -10407.4 
Oceania 432.3 342.7 89.6 789.9 459.8 330.1 1804 732.5 1071.5 
Fruits and vegetables 
Africa 1076 2337.5 -1261.5 2229.1 4335 -2106 5838.4 11242 -5403.6 
Asia 12893.8 12273.5 620.2 21455 23091.5 -1636.5 55673.7 54074.9 1598.8 
Caribbean 306.2 334 -33.7 574.6 331.1 243.5 843.7 601.7 242 
Europe 43460.1 29873.1 13587 70781.1 51289.2 19491.9 113218 82236.7 30981.3 
North 
America 
10640.9 7890.4 2750.5 20378 13958.1 6419.9 37481.5 28364.1 9117.4 
South 
America 
1392.4 5395.4 -4003 1818.4 9378.9 -7560.5 4461.3 18768.2 -14306.9 
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Table A.2. List of countries by sub-samples. 
Middle income Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, South 
Africa 
  
Low income Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, 
Central Africa Re, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Togo 
  
Non-oil producer Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Central Africa Re., Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Togo.  
  
Oil producer Angola, Chad, Cameroon, Congo, Guinea, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Niger  
 
